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tibetan reFugees as obJeCts oF development: 
indian development philosophy and reFugee 
resistanCe in the establishment oF luKzung 
samdrupling, the First tibetan reFugee 
settlement in india
The paper looks at the development philosophy behind the establishment of the Lukzung Samdrupling, the 
first Tibetan refugee settlement in India and how it was received by the refugees. After reviewing Chinese 
development concepts in the 1950’s and 1960’s with an emphasis on Tibet, the paper explores the central 
concepts of Indian development philosophy at that time, such as cooperative, scientific farming and modern 
family planning, and how they were implemented in the design of Lukzung Samdrupling. Based on docu-
ments in the old settlement files the impact of various development schemes as well as resistance among the 
refugees are also highlighted with a special focus on the role of the foreign donor organization Swiss Techni-
cal Cooperation. In conclusion, the paper points out the irony in escaping from Tibet to avoid becoming 
objects of Chinese development philosophy only to become objects of a similar Indian development phi-
losophy, and suggests that the planners conceived Lukzung Samdrupling as a model for rural development 
intended to show the benefits of modern life to people in the surrounding area and to bring development to 
an underdeveloped region of the country.
TIBETAN REFUGEES TO INDIA
What happens when a group of geographically, 
socially, and culturally displaced people land in the 
lap of development agents who have a distinct vision 
of how to create a modern society? In what ways do 
such a disenfranchised people accept—or reject and 
resist—social engineering projects designed to trans-
form them into modern beings? These are the central 
questions addressed in this paper on the establish-
ment of Tibetan refugee settlements in South India. 
The poignant irony to this story is that, in fleeing 
the modernizing forces that a communist China had 
launched on Tibetan society, the refugees came under 
the sway of an Indian socialist development philoso-
phy that resembled, in startling ways, the very system 
they had abandoned everything to escape.
In the aftermath of a failed uprising in 1959 
against China’s rule, the Dalai Lama fled into exile in 
India followed by tens of thousands of refugees. After 
an initial adjustment period whereby refugees lived 
in transit camps, a major effort was initiated to find 
more viable housing and employment opportunities 
for the displaced Tibetans. Lukzung Samdrupling, lo-
cated west of Mysore city in Karnataka state, was the 
first Tibetan refugee settlement established in India. 
Located by the Cauvery River near the Kodagu Hills, 
it remains the largest Tibetan settlement in exile. The 
construction of the first camp started in 1960 through 
an agreement between the Dalai Lama’s private office, 
the Government of India, and foreign donor organi-
zations, notably Swiss Technical Cooperation (Swiss 
Tech). Agriculturally based settlements were an alter-
native to the Himalayan road camps where thousands 
of refugees had been put to work by the Indian gov-
ernment, and where the relief work was ill-managed 
and poorly coordinated (Magnusson et al 2009). 
From India’s point of view the relocation of the 
refugees to agricultural settlements was an opportu-
nity to bring large-scale, donor-sponsored projects 
to the less developed rural areas in the country. The 
location of Lukzung Samdrupling near the village of 
Bylakuppe was carefully chosen after a survey carried 
out by the Indian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Da-
lai Lama’s Private Office, and Mysore’s state govern-
ment. It was decided to develop 3,000 acres of land 
leased by the state government to provide a means of 
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This rational approach, in hindsight, has been called 
“evolutionary functionalism.” As Robertson notes, “planning 
became a credential of and a necessity for independent state-
hood” because it “creates an image of the state as technically 
capable and democratic” (1984: 34). In the era of planned 
development the modern nation emerged as an economic 
machine in which scientific planning of the economy would 
break the chains of traditional life, elevate the nation above 
its underdevelopment, and gradually saturate all aspects of 
life thereby turning the population into modern individuals 
participating in a national economy (Robertson: chapter 1).
One of the central issues in development theory to which 
the “underdevelopment” problem of the new post-colonial 
states was partly attributed was the population issue. In the 
process of planned modern development, the family and 
fertility were viewed through the lens of an economic con-
cern. Development economists, such as Myrdal, expounded 
the need for post-colonial governments to adopt population 
control policies in order to speed up development. Without 
planned population growth, “the rise of levels of living and 
the spread of all the other modernization elements will be 
severely retarded” wrote Myrdal (1987:531). The idea was for 
parents to become “rationally intentional” with their repro-
duction (Ibid: 536).
Fleeing south from Tibet to India, the refugees became 
objects of India’s planned social development schemes and 
subjected to the development policies intended for any popu-
lation living in an “underdeveloped” nation at that time. As 
a consequence, the refugees were socially and economically 
re-organized. The interventions indirectly attempted to rede-
fine kinship relations by pulling the population into global 
processes wherein it became an object and participant of de-
velopment, a receiver of aid from foreign donors, etc. 
The planning and establishment of Lukzung Samdrupling 
was truly a modernization scheme, at least from the policy-
makers’ and planners’ point of view. At their hands they had a 
community from a traditional, semi-feudal society, organized 
in clans and extended families that was displaced from its 
physical place of home. As we shall see, Lukzung Samdru-
pling came to bear the hallmarks of an Indian model settle-
ment, designed according to principles of small family life 
and scientific agriculture. Ironically, it also reflected a devel-
opmental ideology that was being implemented by China on 
the Tibetan Plateau from where these refugees had fled.
OBJECTS OF DEVELOPMENT
Chinese development philosophy during the Mao era was 
characterized by Soviet inspired ideas of mass industrializa-
tion, collectivization of agriculture, and central planning as 
manifested in programs like the first Five Year Plan (1953 
- 1957) and the “The Great Leap Forward” (1958 - 1962). 
Maoist socialism is often associated with agrarian socialism 
although the Five-year plans also tried to kick-start economic 
growth through massive infrastructural projects and the es-
tablishment of heavy industry, sometimes with disastrous re-
livelihood for 3,000 refugees. When the first group of settlers 
arrived in late 1960 they encountered a recently prepared 
clearing, surrounded by forest, which had been drained and 
fitted with tents. A few bamboo cottages housed administra-
tion offices. The rehabilitation of the refugees was managed 
by an Indian “Divisional Officer” in cooperation with two rep-
resentatives from the Dalai Lama’s Private Office. The settlers 
were immediately put to work clearing the forest for farming 
and constructing a village of semi-detached brick houses. But 
progress was slow and the subsistence needs of the refugees 
could not be met according to plans. To sort out the prob-
lems, foreign advisors from Swiss Tech were brought in to 
take charge. 
In a research project looking at the early development of 
Lukzung Samdrupling, I have studied the old records and 
registers kept at the settlement’s administrative office.1 Work-
ing through this material I could not help noticing how the 
refugees and their settlement are often treated as objects of 
modernization, and how the establishment of Lukzung Sam-
drupling was not just about relief, but about making modern 
people. This modernization project is clearly represented by 
the methods of Swiss Tech. The settlement’s geography, the 
principles for land distribution, and the camp design also 
show that Lukzung Samdrupling was constructed for mod-
ern—and not traditional—Tibetan living. 
In this paper I investigate the background of relief and 
modernization, rehabilitation and development, and why 
they were implemented in the settlement of Tibetan refugees. 
The joint forces of foreign and Indian development agents 
had what seemed to be a highly malleable population of de-
velopment subjects who could be molded into modern beings 
in line with development philosophies of that time. But as we 
shall see, modernization schemes unleashed on the refugees 
often failed to consider normative family systems and other 
cultural issues. The result was a continuous series of subtle 
acts of resistance by Tibetans so that they could shape de-
velopment schemes to better fit their own lived realities and 
aspirations.
DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL ENGINEERING
The Tibetan refugee situation coincided with a surge in 
national development planning, especially in the context of 
the new post-colonial nation states where economists were 
advocating planned social development by means of large-
scale state interventions. It was widely believed that the main 
cause of underdevelopment and poverty was overpopulation. 
The proposed solution was economic growth through indus-
trialization, scientific agricultural methods, and population 
control. Goals were to be accomplished through the involve-
ment of professional experts in policy-making, an approach 
to social development that is often labeled “social engineer-
ing” or “technocracy.”
1. The project titled ”The South Indian Tibetans” was funded by the 
Swedish Research Council and the Crafoord Foundation.
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sults like the great famine that transpired between 1959 and 
1962.
When China moved on Tibet in the 1950’s, part of the 
purpose was to “liberate” the people by acting as an agent for 
social change in what was perceived as a backward society 
with an oppressed people who had been misled by Western 
imperialistic forces (Hasmath and Hsu 2007: 126). From the 
Chinese perspective, Tibet’s social system had to be replaced 
by a modern and rational communist system and developed 
by the same means as the motherland. It was believed that the 
people of Tibet needed China’s assistance to rid themselves 
of the oppressive yoke and that the country would be bet-
ter off integrated in the Chinese nation state (Norbu 2001). 
In the beginning China’s government employed a gradualist 
and pragmatic strategy to modernize Tibet by encouraging in-
dustrial production, business ventures, scientific agriculture, 
social reforms, anti-slavery campaigns and redistribution of 
land to weaken the aristocracy (Hasmath and Hsu 2007: 126, 
Goldstein 2007).2
After the Lhasa uprising in 1959 China abandoned its 
gradualist strategy and adopted a more repressive and harsh 
policy. The Chinese government disregarded the 1951 agree-
ment to support development in Tibet without eroding Tibet-
an autonomy and initiated socialist reforms with little respect 
for Tibetan sentiments. Officially, the reforms led to an in-
creased production of just about all goods, but the statistics of 
this period are unreliable. During the 1960’s, Tibet’s economy 
continued to be based on agriculture and animal husbandry, 
and it was not until the 1970’s that people’s communes started 
to become established (Dreyer 2003: 412-414).
In 1960 Ginsburgs and Mathos reviewed China’s impact 
on Tibet during the 1950s,3 emphasizing the construction 
of an infrastructure for transportation and communication 
to secure dominance in the region. According to reports at 
that time, Chinese technology and expertise seems to have 
had a strong impact on Tibetan agriculture. Mechanized and 
scientifically based agricultural methods were introduced by 
advisors and supplemented by financial support (Ginsburgs 
and Mathos 1960a: 105-106). Although the natural resources 
of the Tibetan plateau had been surveyed, Tibetan industrial 
development continued to be marginal.
Ginsburgs and Mathos (1960a, 1960b) argue that despite 
the Chinese physical impact on Tibet in the 1950’s the so-
cial changes were limited. The reforms “concerned only the 
fringe areas of Tibetan life” (1960: 123). A point they make 
is how China tried “to win the allegiance of the disinherited 
sections of the Tibetan population through a show of Chinese 
technical skill” and build a “goodwill […] among the masses” 
(1960b: 123) as a platform for introducing future social re-
2.See also the 10-point document laying out the terms for the peaceful 
liberation of Tibet (Goldstein 2007:37). 
3. Ginsburg’s and Mathos’ articles mainly rely on newspaper reports in 
Chinese and Western newspapers. It is obvious from the text that, although 
the authors are critical of the Chinese presence in Tibet, they take a positive 
view on modern development.
forms.4
Birth control and family planning policies in China in the 
1950’s and 1960’s vacillated between two positions, often in 
response to shifts in Chairman Mao’s position and ideological 
struggles within the Communist Party. On the one hand the 
policy was influenced by ideas associated with contemporary 
development theory and its explicit link between planned 
economic development and birth control. On the other hand 
was the view that China needed workers to build a social-
ist economy, and that birth control was an imperialist policy 
and foreign encroachment. This position was reinforced by 
conservative Chinese family values. Referring to this dialec-
tic process, researchers of family planning have described the 
Mao era policies as a “tentative approval of individual ‘birth-
control’ (jiezhishengyu)” (Greenhalgh and Winckler 2005: 
47) or a “stir and hush” muddle (Scharping 2003: 43). How-
ever, when birth control was advocated, it was in the context 
of planned economic development.5 As rapid industrializa-
tion led to a large in-migration from rural to urban areas, and 
demographic calculations of the population growth rate made 
possible by the 1953 census were pointing towards a popula-
tion of 800 million by 1967, the leadership seemed to have 
been forced into birth control realpolitik. 
The birth control policy was developed on a gradualist 
template:
There should also be a ten-year program for 
family planning. However, it should not be 
promoted in the minority nationality areas or 
sparsely populated regions. Even in densely 
populated areas it is necessary to try it out in 
selected places and then spread it step by step 
until family planning gradually becomes univer-
sal (quote from speech by Mao at the Enlarged 
Third Plenary Session of the Eight Central Com-
mittee of the Chinese Communist Party, October 
9, 1957 published in Tien 1980: 87 pp). 
Educational campaigns were launched in larger cities, 
followed by explorative campaigns in rural areas. Starting in 
1958 an infrastructure reaching down to provincial level was 
being established in order to implement population control 
targets. But by the start of the Great Leap Forward the efforts 
were halted as the views of leaders and intellectuals reverted 
back to the pro-natalist and anti-imperialist position, only to 
swing back again in 1962. It was not until the mid 1960’s that 
rural areas and villages in several provinces became objects 
for birth-control policies. Evidence suggests that birth-con-
trol ideas such as “respecting the limit of two children” were 
spread throughout China by party cadres and the PLA during 
the Cultural Revolution (Scharping 2003: 48). By the early 
1970’s slogans such as “one child isn’t too few, two are just 
4. On this subject, see also Goldstein 2007:38.
5. See, for instance, a speech by Mao in 1957 on the necessity of 
birth-control (Tien 1980: 87).
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Chakravarty (1987: 9) points out that it was strongly influ-
enced by Fabian socialism (see also Tyson 1966 chapter 2). 
Fabian socialism is a pragmatic, incremental and reformist 
rather than revolutionary approach to change that is similar 
to the social democratic ideology that guided governments in 
countries like Sweden during this era. In contrast to China’s 
Maoist approach in Tibet after 1959, Nehruvian reforms did 
not target private capital, rich landowners or the middle class. 
The good society was to be realized through centralized and 
scientific planning in order to achieve growth and, in the lon-
ger run, the social equality that was central to Nehru’s think-
ing. It was, as Akbar (1988: 466) writes in his biography of 
Nehru, “socialism with a scientific face” (“scientific human-
ism”, as Nehru himself called it) designed to create a modern 
society based on science, not only in the sphere of produc-
tion but all the way down to family life (Ghosh 1997, Gopal 
1984).
Nehru, like many leaders of the post-colonial states, ac-
cepted the development economists’ new global discourse 
that emphasized the need for structurally backward nations to 
catch up. India after independence was economically vulner-
able in the world system but the state was strong (albeit per-
haps “soft” in Myrdal’s sense of the concept). The whole idea 
of embarking on a rapid social and economic development 
can perhaps be seen as a logical response from Nehru and 
the Congress Party as responsible for reasserting control over 
the “underdeveloped” Indian society. Planned development 
becomes an instrument of state legitimacy, a self-justification 
of its centralized authority (Bose 1997: 53, Chatterjee 1994: 
204, see also Herring 1999, Robertson 1984: 26). For Nehru, 
the development of heavy industry such as steel, power and 
machine building plants, the communication and transporta-
tion sectors, the oil industry and parts of the chemical indus-
try was the only road to socialism. As Gopal (1984:163) sum-
marizes Nehru’s vision, “there could be no socialism without 
technological growth.”
The third Five Year Plan turned to the development of 
agriculture, with collective farming as a key objective. Un-
like in China, collective farming was neither accomplished 
through the establishment of peoples’ communes nor through 
land reforms other than the abolishment of the Zamindar sys-
tem in 1948 (a feudal system of revenue rights). Cooperative 
organization was seen as the primary agent of agricultural de-
velopment and the “highest form of socialism” (Bhuleshskar 
1969: 33). It was believed that the key to solving India’s prob-
lems lay in socialism in its “scientific economic sense” and as 
a philosophy of life (Nehru, speech 1959 cited in Bhuleshkar 
1969). But Nehru put his own brand on it by recognizing the 
individual freedom of the farmer:
The only way open to us is […] the co-operative 
movement. Through co-operation alone can the 
individual, the small individual, keep his indi-
viduality intact, his freedom intact and yet func-
tion in a big way and take advantage of science 
fine, three are too much” and the principle of “later” (births), 
“longer” (birth intervals), and “fewer” (children)” became the 
official policy in China (Ibid: 49).6 It was only in 1978 that 
the one-child policy became the law of the land, but in real-
ity China’s birth control policy was a patchwork affair. People 
living in rural areas and members of minority groups could 
generally have more than one child (Gu et al. 2007).
According to several sources (see Scharping 2003 table 1) 
birth-control policies were not officially implemented in Tibet 
until 1975, although in reality they were only implemented 
starting in the mid-1980s in urban areas and a few years later 
in rural areas (Goldstein and Beall 1991). By the late 1980s 
the official policy in Tibet was that rural dwellers could have 
three children, but in reality many families continued to ex-
ceed this limit without being penalized (Goldstein et al 2002), 
 In summary, after 1959 China launched a concerted at-
tempt to modernize Tibet through various policies aimed at 
industrializing the economy, mechanizing agriculture, orga-
nizing farmers and herders into collective units of production, 
and limiting population growth. Curiously, China’s develop-
ment approach to Tibet resembled in many ways elements 
of India’s philosophy for modernizing rural segments of its 
economy shortly after gaining independence.
INDIA’S PLANNED DEVELOPMENT
Comparing Chinese and Indian development philoso-
phies in the 1950s and 1960s reveals more similarities than 
differences. Both worked within a socialist framework that 
emphasized industrialization and scientific agriculture, advo-
cated centralized planning and state interventions to increase 
economic growth, and envisioned birth control as a prereq-
uisite for achieving a modern society. Both philosophies also 
assumed a view of the citizen as a cog in this great economic 
machinery, and as someone who willingly would participate 
in the development project.
At the time of the planning and construction of Lukzung 
Samdrupling the Indian government was just departing on its 
third Five Year Plan (1960-1965). The second Five Year Plan 
(1955-1960) had sought to accelerate industrial development 
and was a manifestation of the Nehruvian vision of social 
change (named after India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal 
Nehru, who held the office from 1947 to 1964). It was, as the 
Indian economist Sukhamoy Chakravarty suggests, a blue-
print for a “profoundly interventionist” development philoso-
phy and an expression of “state interventionist developmen-
talism” (Herring 1999). When the Indian National Planning 
Committee was formed in 1938 with Nehru as its chairman, 
its preferred methods of intervention were via state regulation 
and co-ordination, including state owned and state controlled 
key industries, banking and public utilities, and a cooperative 
reorganization of agriculture (Nehru 1956: 400-409). 
Like many students of Nehru’s vision of a modern India, 
6. See also Orleans (1978) for China’s propaganda material on family 
planning. 
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and technology (Nehru addressing the Indian 
Co-operative Congress in New Dehli, April 12, 
1958. Cited in Bhuleshkar 1969: 33).
The cooperative model was popular among governments 
in developing countries in the 1950s and 1960s, not only in 
Asia but also in Africa. Many believed it would create the nec-
essary social cohesion for the modernization project to work 
(Robertson 1984: 160). Indian planners found inspiration 
in the co-operative side of the British agricultural movement 
emerging in the second half of the nineteenth century and the 
German rural credit unions pioneered by Friedrich Wilhelm 
Raiffeisen in the 1860s. Many British co-operatives centered 
on group purchases of farm inputs, but from the beginning of 
the twentieth century they also started to tenure small land 
holdings, bottle cheese, and make milk (Goddard 2000). 
For Indian planners the idea of a multi-purpose coopera-
tive extended beyond credit and farming input to include 
various business and service activities. The first two Five Year 
Plans had attempted to centralize the control of cooperatives 
and enforce production targets, but with little success. In the 
third Five Year Plan the planners changed direction and were 
now talking about cooperatives as a model for decentralized 
democracy and a “prime mover for organizing” (Bhuleshkar 
1969: 35) agriculture, irrigation, small industry, processing, 
marketing, distribution, supplies, rural electrification, hous-
ing, construction and the provision of essential amenities for 
local communities in order to achieve higher production, 
diversification, an expansion of the realm of technology and 
more employment opportunities within the rural economy 
(Third Five Year Plan, chapter XIII: 200). It was also believed 
that cooperatives would allow poor farmers to become less 
dependent on private moneylenders and big landowners. 
Nehru looked at the cooperative as a higher form of social 
organization, a “glimpse of socialism” that would foster a life-
long attitude among members that prepared them for a fully 
developed socialist society (Gopal 1984: 114, 116).
The cooperative would, in the view of the planners, serve 
to facilitate mechanization of agriculture and the introduction 
of scientific farming methods. Small plots were believed to 
be less suitable for progressive farming methods. The coop-
erative would aggregate smallholdings into larger, more eco-
nomically efficient units more suitable for modern agricultur-
al methods and large-scale management (Schiller 1969: 45).
From the economist’s point of view there is also the other, 
and perhaps most crucial, side of agricultural development. 
The idea is that during the early stages of industrialization the 
agricultural sector must provide cheap labor and food to the 
industrial sector. This is not actually stated in the third Five 
Year Plan but Charkravarty (1987: 21) attributes it to the di-
rect influence that visiting economists like P. A. Baran, Oskar 
Lange and Charles Bettleheim exerted on Nehru’s main archi-
tect, P. C. Mahalanobis, regarding methods of economic plan-
ning. In hindsight, the idealistic agricultural reform policy 
was perhaps over-optimistic of what village-based traditional 
agriculture could achieve given implementation difficulties, 
the vested interest of landlords, and deep seated Indian social 
stratification (Charkravarty1987).
At the time of the first Five Year Plans (1950-1960) India’s 
approach to a population policy was remarkably optimistic, 
perhaps a reflection of the general technocratic belief in the 
methods of planned social development in this era. The vision 
driving India’s population policy is spelled out very clearly in 
a 1968 article by Chandrashekar, an Indian demographer and 
economist who was elected to the Lok Sabha’s upper house in 
1964 and appointed Minister of Health and Family Planning 
by Indira Gandhi in 1967. With the Indian population pass-
ing the 500 million mark in the early 1960’s and experiencing 
an annual growth rate of 2.5 percent, Chandrashekar called 
for an urgent “anti-natalist” policy targeting a 50 percent re-
duction of the birth rate by the mid 1970s (Chandrashekar 
1968: 643). The task was to convince married couples (num-
bering around 90 million at that time) of the need for small 
families (Chandrashekar 1968: 643). In surveys like Mysore’s 
1952 population study a majority of parents stated that they 
preferred three children (including two sons) but in practice 
families continued to be larger (Raina 1988: 21, 59, Guilmoto 
and Rajan 2005).
The anti-natalist policy was an extension of the state-
sponsored family planning ideas spelled out in the first Five 
Year Plan: “The reduction of the birth rate to the extent nec-
essary to stabilize the population at a level consistent with 
the requirements of the national economy” (First Five Year 
Plan cited in Ram 2004: 106, see also Raina 1988: 6). Ini-
tially, limiting the average family size was to be achieved by 
increasing birth spacing and practicing the rhythm method. 
Chandrasekhar advocated family planning messages, such as 
“displaying the happy faces of a four-person family with the 
slogan, “Two or three children – enough” (Chandrashekar 
1968: 644), disseminated through songs and motion pic-
tures, billboards and radio. 
When the third Five-Year Plan was laid out in 1961 it 
included birth control methods such as sterilization, IUCD 
(the loop), condoms and the pill (Chandrashekar 1968: Ibid: 
645). However, despite its explicitly stated relevance to In-
dia’s economic development, the enactment of the population 
policy was slow (Samuel 1966) and the programs did not re-
ally start to be implemented until the ambitious and often 
coercive national campaigns launched under Indira Gandhi’s 
government. 
The blueprint of the family planning project was based on 
scientific research. An elaborate administrative structure with 
national policy targets was conceived, almost like a military 
campaign (see the organization charts in Raina 1988: 66-69, 
76-83). Even though part of the explanation for the choice of 
strategy and organization probably lies with the government’s 
belief in centralized power and planning, another part prob-
ably lies in Nehru’s keen interest in the work of the British 
military strategist Liddell Hart (Gopal 1994 p 290) and the 
fact that the director of the family planning campaign was B. 
120 HIMALAYA  XXX (1-2) 2010
a rational and general will of development shared between 
planners and the people of India; the epitome of the modern 
Indian citizen as he/she emerges in the Nehruvian vision of 
modern India and in the population policies of the first three 
Five Year Plans. 
When discussions began about agricultural settlements 
as a solution for the Tibetan refugees in India, development 
towards socialism through industrialization and scientific ag-
riculture was on the top of the Indian government’s agenda 
while birth control and family planning was on the rise. The 
planners wanted to accelerate the progression by raising the 
bar in the second Five Year Plan, and by promoting coopera-
tive organization as a way to mobilize people to participate in 
the national economy and, in due time, embrace socialism.
REFUGEES IN THE HANDS OF INDIAN 
DEVELOPMENT
Although there was an increase in economic growth and 
India did fairly well up until the mid-1960s, observers gener-
ally attribute the limited success of India’s planned develop-
ment to overambitious targets and failures in the implementa-
tion stage impeded by recalcitrant state governments (Herring 
1999), corruption (Gopal 1984: 166), a stiffening bureau-
cracy, an inability to move reform projects beyond the paper 
stage, as well as events out of the government’s control. The 
ambitious Community Development Program launched in 
1955 to transform the social and economic life of Indian vil-
lages lost its drive to become more of an “official organization” 
(Ibid: 167, Hegde 2000). To break this trend, Nehru tried to 
reactivate the panchayat raj as an alternative to government 
administration. But state governments remained passive to 
the initiative. This was also a time when communal conflicts 
and minority rifts imposed challenges to the development of 
the modern Indian nation-state.
Nevertheless it was in the context of these optimistic, 
ambitious and technocratic Indian development schemes in-
spired by socialism that the Tibetan refugees arrived in India 
around 1960 and the decision was made to construct agri-
cultural settlements for them. When the refugees crossed the 
border to India many did so to escape China’s effort to trans-
form Tibet’s economy and society. Ironically, Tibetans found 
themselves to be objects of the Nehruvian philosophy that 
shared many of its basic tenets with Maoism. 
Compared to an Indian village community that was firmly 
embedded in the traditional system of social stratification and 
land ownership, the Tibetan refugee community was a much 
more malleable object of development. The refugee commu-
nity was in a kind of liminal stage: free-floating, uprooted 
from their home, disaggregated and disorganized and not yet 
settled in India. Planners did not have to wait for people to 
adapt to the reform policies. There were no recalcitrant in-
terests or political opposition making policy implementation 
difficult, and whatever objections the weak and powerless 
refugees might have had could easily be overcome. The vi-
sions and policies of planned social development embodied 
L. Raina, a colonel recruited from the Indian Army Medical 
Corps.
In 1953, under the first Five Year Plan, a national Fam-
ily Planning Research and Program Committee (FPRPC) was 
established followed by a Sub Committee for Demographic 
Studies and a Council for Population Studies in 1954. The 
objective was to carry out studies and produce statistics as 
basic data for the planning process. In 1956, under the sec-
ond Five Year Plan, a Central Family Planning Board (CFPB) 
was formed and the Ministry of Health appointed a national 
director for family planning supported by state-level family 
planning officers (FPOs). In 1957 efforts were accelerated 
when the Minister of Health, the Gandhian Raj Kumari Amrit 
Kaur who had reservations about family planning methods, 
was replaced by the more progressive minded D. P. Karmakar. 
The national planners did not fully trust the capacity of the 
local Primary Health Centres and Maternity and Child Health 
Centres to carry out the implementation task and therefore 
established a separate network of Family Planning Teams. In 
1958, 675 teams (452 of them rural) were operative across 
the nation. 
During the following years State Family Planning Boards 
and District Family Planning Committees were formed and 
the small family policy was promoted through Village Leaders 
Orientation Camps. During the third Five Year Plan there was 
an attempt to introduce village-level family planning commit-
tees and in 1962 a number of Pilot Demonstration Districts 
were selected to serve as models for family planning educa-
tion. At the same time the human genetics issue was rising 
on the population policy agenda, and the well-known British 
geneticist and socialist J. B. S. Haldane was appointed as head 
of the biometry unit at the Indian Statistical Institute (ISI).7
What is interesting is how changes in the family were be-
ing linked by the planners to the economic development of 
the nation. In the Five Year Plans the family is treated as a 
rational economic unit. The purpose of the population policy 
is to provide incentives to make it rational for families to limit 
their size in the economic interest of the state. Population 
control and family planning thereby emerged as important 
attributes in the image of the modern and progressive post-
colonial Indian state. The challenge of the planners was to 
refashion India’s population to measure up to this image (Ram 
2004: 82). 
Just as the nation-state must embody universal 
rationality on behalf of the welfare of the nation, 
so the family members must come to take on 
the attributes of rationality in order to plan the 
welfare of the whole family (Ram 2004:106).
This planning philosophy takes for granted that there is 
7. Since the object of this paper is the Tibetan refugee settlement 
Lukzung Samdrupling (located in Mysore State at the time of the establish-
ment), it is worth mentioning that Mysore was one of the most progressive 
agents in the provision of health services, seen by many as a good model, 
which gained it the label “Mysore Pattern.”
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by the Five Year Plans that had encountered implementation 
obstacles in Indian society could be directly applied with little 
resistance (or so it was hoped) in the planning and estab-
lishment of Lukzung Samdrupling. The settlement could be 
constructed with a modern infrastructure and mechanized, 
scientific farming methods as a model for Indian rural devel-
opment.
THE SMALL FAMILY PRINCIPLE
The refugees were settled as a community on their own 
demarcated land with their own administrative structure. Be-
cause of the ongoing Sino-Indian border conflict authorities 
felt need to control the settlement’s activities and inhabitants 
so a dual administrative structure was established: the Indian 
side was headed by an officer from the Indian Administrative 
Service with the designation of Special Officer, while the Ti-
betan side was headed by a representative of the Dalai Lama’s 
nascent government in exile. Although the Tibetans were 
refugees fleeing from Tibet they were, in the eyes of the In-
dian government, in danger of being infiltrated by spies from 
China. Access to the settlement was therefore strictly limited 
and the refugees were not allowed to move outside without 
written permission from the Special Officer. 
The most obvious element of Indian planning philoso-
phy in the settlement was perhaps the physical design of the 
camps: it starts from the small family principle inherent in 
India’s population policy. Brick houses constructed for the 
refugees were built to accommodate small families, and as a 
consequence the refugees had to be re-organized into small 
households irrespective of the real family relationships among 
those living under a single roof. 
A house included two rooms and an indoor toilet. Each 
house would, ideally, hold a father, a mother, and two to three 
children. The official version of the small family principle is 
that the average refugee family proved to be of that size (The 
Office of H. H. Dalai Lama 1969: 5). However, it does not 
appear very likely that the refugees left Tibet in small family 
units, especially since this was not the common type of fam-
ily unit in the agro-pastoral communities traditionally found 
in Tibet. In fact, historical and demographic research shows 
that the typical rural household in pre-1959 Tibet consisted 
of up to 15 members representing three generations (Gold-
stein 1971; Childs 2003). Although it is difficult to prove that 
the small conjugal family was not the norm among the refu-
gees during the early 1960s, a close look at the register of 
Camp 1, the first camp established in the settlement, reveals 
that in 1966 many households appear to be nuclear families 
with additional people appended, and that some households 
contain teenaged children of parents who were living in oth-
er households. It is also possible to find cases where people 
coming from different places in Tibet were placed together in 
one household. Above all, there are a number of households 
recorded in the register that consist of two couples without 
children. It is possible that these unions were formed in India 
to suit the settlement’s small family concept.
As the community was started fresh administrators could 
exercise a degree of control over the population through in-
struments like the camp registers where every member’s de-
mographic data were recorded. The Representative’s office 
was obliged to monitor each refugee’s activities and move-
ments, changes in the family such as births, deaths and mar-
riages, and land allotment, and regularly submit reports to 
the Special Officer for inspection. These administrative duties 
amounted to a rather bombastic bureaucracy that required a 
lot of attention from the Indian and Tibetan administrators 
and engendered evasive strategies from the settlers. This is 
evidenced by the many short notes in the old files from the 
Indian Administration to the settlement office marked “ur-
gent” and pointing out passed deadlines and demanding first 
priority (see Magnusson et al 2009: 21).
In line with India’s national objective to control its popu-
lation, there were attempts to introduce Tibetan refugees to 
family planning campaigns. In 1973 the Indian administra-
tion informed the Tibetan Representative that a “Vasectomy 
Camp” was to be held in the settlement to “fulfill the targets.”8 
It is unclear what became of that program. However, when a 
family planning unit asked to visit the settlement in 1976 the 
Representative cancelled the visit on the grounds that “the 
population of Tibetans in India is negligible compared to Ti-
betans still in Tibet where the Communist Chinese is trying 
to wipe out the very Tibetan race.”9 This is a clear example 
whereby the Tibetans own political and social agendas con-
flicted with the plans of developers to transform them into 
“rational” actors reproducing small families.
ALLOTMENT OF LAND AND LAND TENURE
The settlement of the Tibetan refugees mirrored the Ne-
hruvian idea of development through industrialization and 
cooperative, scientific farming. The original settlement plans 
included both agricultural and small-scale industrial settle-
ments in the form of handicraft production such as carpet 
weaving. The handicraft societies and multipurpose societies 
were started on the initiatives of Tibetan religious commu-
nities or communities originating in the same geographical 
place in Tibet, for instance, Iddgah, an industrial settlement 
of Tibetan Muslims established in Srinagar (Mondal 2001: 
246). They were initially more successful than the big agri-
cultural settlements (Gooch 1969: 200). In 1965 the Tibetan 
Industrial Rehabilitation Society (TIRS) was set up and ini-
tialized a woolen mill, tea estates and a craft community in 
Kangra, a limestone quarry in Kumrao, a hydrated lime plant 
in Sataun, and a fiber glass factory in Paonta supporting, in 
total, around a thousand households.
Although nothing is mentioned about the origin of the 
cooperative organization of agricultural settlements in official 
accounts such as the Office of H. H. Dalai Lama’s (1969) re-
8. File 29 Old, letter from the Administrator III TRR Scheme Bylak-
uppe to the Representative dated 16 March 1973.
9. File 55 Old, letter from the Representative to the In-charge Admin-
istrator III TRR Scheme Bylakuppe, dated 10 December 1976.
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during the first years while the land was still being reclaimed, 
the settlers were forced to collectively cultivate whatever land 
was available at a daily wage of two rupees and rely on free 
additional provisions from the government and donor orga-
nizations.12
Even though the household was intended to farm its 
own patch of land, the leasing system was designed so that 
if a refugee left the settlement for good or died, the land was 
returned to the state government and redistributed by the 
Indian Special Officer. In that sense, it was a communal or 
perhaps even collective land tenure plan where leased ten-
ure was combined with government ownership. Government 
ownership was further reinforced in that the refugees did not 
actually have to pay for the lease. In the beginning this sys-
tem seems to have hampered the initiative of the settler to 
work the land although later, when the government started to 
charge land revenue tax, they seem to have regained it (Office 
of H. H. Dalai Lama 1969: 4).
Resistance to the goal of communal land tenure is evident 
in the norms of inheritance that developed in opposition to 
the original settlement plans. At the death of a settler the land 
was to be returned to the Indian government for redistribu-
tion, but in reality the land was passed on to kin under the dis-
cretion of the Representative’s office. The issue was frequently 
raised by the Indian Special Officer13 and in the Camp regis-
ters there are actually a number of entries specifying that a 
deceased person’s land went to a son or daughter, sometimes 
one living in a separate household. The Indian administrators’ 
cognizance of this practice is reflected in complaints about 
“unauthorized cultivation”, and, sometimes, direct references 
as in a letter to the Tibetan Representative:
It may also please be noted that the Representa-
tive has no authority to allot land to whomso-
ever he likes. When once the settler leaves the 
Settlement permanently the land given on lease 
basis becomes the property of Government.14
The refugees also adapted to the situation by forming un-
official economic alliances in farming based on extended fam-
ily bonds (Magnusson et al 2009). 
MODERNIZATION AND AGRICULTURAL 
MECHANIZATION
The first years of farming in the settlement were difficult 
12. With limited land access as the clearing of forest continued, 
many of the original 666 settlers had to wait to get their acre of land. In 
the meantime they cultivated 28 acres as a co-operative. The produce was 
collected by the Indian Special Officer and distributed to the families. In 
1963 an additional 483 acres were allotted and by 1967 almost all of the 
3,000 acres were under cultivation (The Office of H. H. Dalai Lama 1969: 
9, 1981: 103).
13. File 29 Old, letter III TRR PR/Kis11/72-73, and in File 29 Old, 
letter III TRR PR 40/74-75.
14. File: 29old, letter from A. Ganesh to the Representative, dated 3 
November, 1972.
port on the first ten years of rehabilitation in India, it seems 
likely that it was a part of the settlement plan to foster the 
community towards a socialist attitude to life through the co-
operative model in the way Nehru had visualized it. Specifi-
cally, even though the Tibetan Cooperative Society (TCS) in 
Lukzung Samdrupling was not registered under the Mysore 
State Cooperative Act until 1964, the agriculture work in the 
settlement functioned as a cooperative from the beginning. 
Considering the important part played by the cooperative 
ideal in Indian planned development, it is probable that the 
initiative came from the Indian advisors rather than from the 
settlers themselves. The Cooperative Society carried out the 
settlement’s trading activities, and was funded by loans and 
donations as no fees were collected from the members. After 
some time the Cooperative Society expanded its activities to 
animal husbandry, a poultry farm, a local transport service, 
and a flourmill. In 1970 the society took over responsibility 
for a workshop started by Swiss Tech and was one of the big-
gest in the Mysore area. In addition to its workshop services, 
it also provided employees with housing and dining facili-
ties. In the same year a tractor section with 17 tractors and 
28 drivers was branched off into a separate enterprise and 
in 1975 it took up local dealership for an Indian Oil service 
station.10
The development of TCS indicates that it has functioned 
as an autonomous and strong parallel organization to the set-
tlement office headed by the Representative of H. H. the Dalai 
Lama. TCS plays a main role in the economic activities of the 
settlement, while the settlement office mainly keeps records 
of the refugees and implements welfare policies under the 
Central Tibetan Administration’s Home Department. Unfor-
tunately, TCS’ old files are long lost thus making further anal-
ysis and triangulation with interviews and documents in the 
settlement office impossible. Despite the fact that the Tibetan 
settlers have deviated in many ways from the original social-
ist development intentions, it is clear that the co-operative 
model has been at the core of the economic and agricultural 
development of Lukzung Samdrupling and remains so until 
today. 
The subsistence plan was to lease 3,000 acres of land 
belonging to the Mysore State government to the settlers in 
Lukzung Samdrupling. Every settler over four years of age 
was to be allotted one acre of land for farming. Land allot-
ment was linked to household units and thus the idea of small 
families (five members). The planners had calculated that five 
acres per household/family was sufficient for its subsistence. 
This estimate was not shared by Mysore State’s Department of 
Agriculture that felt one acre per person was not enough to 
provide “full living”, nor full occupation. It was advised that 
the settlement also needed to mix agriculture with “side oc-
cupations” such as dairying and raising poultry.11 In practice, 
10. See Office of H. H. Dalai Lama 1969, 1989.
11. File: 55 Old, letter from the Joint Director of Agriculture, Depart-
ment of Agriculture, Mysore State Dr H.R. Arakeri to H. Luthi, dated 25 
August, 1965.
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and marked by a lack of resources. There was not yet enough 
land cleared for every settler to receive one acre. Water was in 
shortage, and crops failed due to unsuitable farming methods 
and crop choices. Agricultural production was not enough 
to meet the subsistence needs of the refugees, pressing the 
Indian government and donor organizations to continue pro-
viding free supplementary rations. To exacerbate matters, a 
severe water shortage in 1963 led to an even smaller harvest. 
In response, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs decided to 
bring in the expertise of Swiss Technical Cooperation (Swiss 
Tech) to revamp the development in the settlement (Office of 
H. H. Dalai Lama 1969: 11).
Swiss Tech is without doubt the foreign donor organiza-
tion that came to have the greatest impact on the develop-
ment of Lukzung Samdrupling. When the Swiss experts ar-
rived in Bylakuppe in 1964/65, they immediately proceeded 
to fit the settlement with modern technology. Two bulldozers 
were put to work between 1965 – 1966 to clear the rest of 
the forest for farming and a planned dairy farm, adding an 
additional 3,427 productive acres to the settlement, of which 
3,340 acres were contoured to be better suited for agriculture. 
In addition, a number of bore wells and five dams with an ir-
rigation capacity of 40-50 acres were constructed. The initial 
settlement crop of cotton, tobacco, dry paddy and ragi that 
proved to be a failure was largely replaced by hybrid maize.
To further develop the settlement’s agriculture, Swiss Tech 
had soil samples of every field analyzed in order to achieve 
an exact scientific match between soil, crop, fertilizer and 
pesticides.15 Fields were set aside for various experiments16 
and a comparative study was made of tractor versus bullock 
ploughed fields proving that tractor ploughed fields were 
likely to produce a fourfold increase in yields:
The explanation is simple – better and deeper 
bed seeds, permitting better moisture absorp-
tion, longer conservation of moisture, better ni-
trification over a longer period, all resulting in 
better, easier and deeper root development, with 
consequently higher yields.17
In fact, Pat Brewster, an agricultural and industrial expert 
working for the foreign organization Committee on Relief 
and Gift Supplies in New Delhi, rules out the use of bullocks 
solely on the grounds that the settlement would need 1,200 of 
them to plough the land, while there would be no facilities to 
keep and graze such a large number of animals.18 Even if bull-
15. File 55 Old, letter from Swiss Tech expert Helmut Luthi to the 
Swiss Ambassador dated 6July, 1967 p 2.
16.File: Mr. Luthi: Letter from the Tibetan Cooperative Society to H. 
Luthi, undated, p 3.
17. File 55 Old, letter from Swiss Tech expert Helmut Luthi to the 
Swiss Ambassador dated 6 July, 1967, p 2.
18. File 55 Old, “Factors to consider in the use of tractors in Bylak-
uppe settlement” by P. Brewster. See also letter from H. Luthi to the Direc-
tors of Agriculture at the Department of Agriculture in Bangalore “Subject: 
Mechanization versus Bullocks”, dated 20 August 1965.
ocks were used they would plow too slowly and inefficiently 
for modern farming. All factors considered, Brewster consid-
ered that the cost of keeping bullocks would actually exceed 
the cost of a sufficient number of tractors and a tractor work-
shop. What is also interesting is Brewster’s argument that the 
Tibetan refugees, lacking experience with bullock aided farm-
ing, are more open to mechanization than Indian farmers. If 
they were to learn from scratch how to farm in South India 
they could just as well learn to farm with tractors. Although 
Brewster conceded that mechanization would possibly lead 
to the resentment and envy of the Indian farmers, it would 
serve as a model for modern agriculture that would eventually 
disseminate to Indian farms as well. The mechanization of the 
settlement’s agriculture was intimately linked by Brewster to 
the big picture: the economic development of India and the 
need to feed a fast growing population: 
We must think of the future […] of the whole 
nation, instead of pinning a vital decision to the 
basis of some conjecture, that some of the sur-
rounding Indian farmers object to mechaniza-
tion at Bylakuppe.19
In addition to the mechanization and employment of sci-
entific agricultural methods, the settlement constructed an 
infrastructure of roads, water, and sewer lines, and in 1966 
the Tibetan Co-operative Society placed an order to Mysore 
State Electricity Board for an electrical power supply to the 
settlement. The grid included power for pumps and mills and 
the workshop as well as for street and house lights (fitted at 
the cost of Rs. 56 per house by St. Mary’s Electricals in Kush-
alnagar). On August 14, 1968, the work was completed and 
the power switched on. However, two months later almost all 
the lights were out20 and transmission lines were frequently 
damaged by Tibetan “cow boys throwing green creepers” at 
them.21
As was the case with the power grid, the construction of 
a water supply was penned and pushed by the Swiss advi-
sors.22 They were in a hurry to develop the settlement and 
complained about the “Tibetan lack of experience and slow 
tempo.”23 The Tibetans, politely appreciating the good inten-
tions of Swiss Tech, did try to slow down the pace of develop-
ment and actually turned down a large-scale plan for sprin-
kler irrigation that included lifting water from the nearby 
Cauvery River and pumping it through a tunnel.
19. File 55 Old “Factors to consider in the use of tractors in Bylak-
uppe settlement” p 4.
20. File: Electricity 1966-69, Letter to the Section Officer, Mysore 
State Electrical Board, Kushalnagar dated 8 October, 1969.
21. File: Electricity 1966-69, Letter from Mysore State Electrical Board 
dated 30 June, 1969.
22. File: Mr. Luthi, letter from H. Luthi to J. Kolb, “Village Water Sup-
plies at Bylakuppe” dated 6 October, 1971.
23. File: Mr. Luthi, Memorandum to the Tibetan Cooperative Society, 
dated 21 December, 1971, see also File: Mr. Luthi, letter from Konchok 
Samden to H. Luthi dated 29 September, 1971.
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submissive and malleable. In a speech to camp and section 
leaders of the settlement an Indian administrator complains 
about the lack of discipline and unwillingness to engage in 
government programs: “I want to say that whenever the gov-
ernment authorities approach you, you have a tendency to 
avoid them.”26 Likewise the Sub Inspector of Police at Bylak-
uppe Police Station complains to the Indian administrator 
about his difficulties in getting updated registration lists from 
the Representative:
I write to you to request that the Tibetan Repre-
sentative are not furnishing the list properly re-
garding the death birth and temporary settlers. 
It is very difficult to even submit monthly state-
ment to my official superior. About 5 to 6 times 
I inspected the Settlement Representatives, to 
furnish regarding the death and birth, but they 
did not submit the same. Now, I request to you 
sir, please issue instructions to the Representa-
tives to submit the list of Tibetans Old & New 
Settlement [Lukzung Samdrupling and Dickey 
Larsoe, both in Bylakuppe] as House-wise and 
camp-wise at present those who residing in the 
Bylakuppe and issue instructions to Representa-
tives to send the list of birth and death in every 
fortnightly. Please treat this as an urgent and ac-
tion taken line of reply may kindly be commu-
nicated and to submit compliance report to my 
official superior.27
Looking more closely at India’s development philosophy 
provides a context to better understand the design and pur-
pose of Lukzung Samdrupling and how it was not merely a 
scheme for the rehabilitation of Tibetan refugees. In a situa-
tion where the principles of Nehruvianism proved to be hard 
to realize in many parts of India, the settlement of the refugees 
became a method of its implementation, showing the benefits 
of modern life to people in the surrounding area and bringing 
development to underdeveloped regions of the country. 
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That the Swiss advisors did not fully understand what 
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themselves and the Tibetans is illustrated in a complaint letter 
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